Volume 3
Issue 2 Spring 1963
Spring 1963

Foreign Corporations—Transaction of Business—A Double
Definition: Melfi v. Goodman, 69 N.M. 488, 368 P.2d 582 (1962); J.
H. Silversmith, Inc., v. Keeter, 382 P.2d 720 (N.M. 1963)
Richard L. Gerding

Recommended Citation
Richard L. Gerding, Foreign Corporations—Transaction of Business—A Double Definition: Melfi v.
Goodman, 69 N.M. 488, 368 P.2d 582 (1962); J. H. Silversmith, Inc., v. Keeter, 382 P.2d 720 (N.M. 1963), 3
Nat. Resources J. 348 (1963).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol3/iss2/11

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 3

FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-TRANSACTION OF BUSINESS-A DOUBLE DEFINI-

TION*-Under section 51-10-4, New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1 a foreign

corporation must comply with certain procedures "before transacting any business in this state. ' 2 A foreign corporation which fails to comply with this "qualifying statute" is prohibited from suing upon contracts made by it in New
Mexico. 3 The Supreme Court of New Mexico has interpreted the term
''transacting any business" to mean the transaction of enough business to
justify the conclusion that the corporation is engaged in intrastate business as opposed to interstate business. 4 Foreign corporations, however, are
allowed to use the courts of New Mexico without complying with the
requirements of section 51-10-4 if the business transacted is not sufficient
to indicate intrastate activity. 5
J. H. Silversmith, Inc. v. Keeter6 involved an action to recover money due
on a promissory note executed in New Mexico by defendant. 7 Plaintiff, a
Colorado corporation, conducted business as a general agent s for various
insurance companies licensed and authorized to transact business in New
Mexico. Defendant, a local insurance agent, 9 was appointed by plaintiff to
represent the companies that plaintiff handled. The agreements between the
parties authorized defendant to accept proposals for insurance, collect pre* Melfi v. Goodman, 69 N.M. 488, 368 P.2d 582 (1962); J. H. Silversmith, Inc. v.
Keeter, 382 P.2d 720 (N.M. 1963).
1. Every foreign corporation, except banking, insurance and railroad corporations, before transacting any business in this state, shall file in the office of
the state corporation commission a copy of its charter, or certificate of incorporation . . . designating its principal office in this state and its agent . . . upon
which agent process against said corporation may be served ....
N.M. Stat Ann. § 51-10-4(a) (1953).
2. Ibid.
3. Until such corporation so transacting business in this state shall have obtained
said certificate from the state corporation commission, it shall not maintain
any action in this state, upon any contract made by it in this state ....
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-10-5 (1953).
4. Abner Mfg. Co. v. McLaughlin, 41 N.M. 97, 64 P.2d 387 (1937) ; Vermont Farm
Mach. Co. v. Ash, 23 N.M. 647, 170 Pac. 741 (1918) ; Goode v. Colorado Inv. Loan Co.,
16 N.M. 461, 117 Pac. 856 (1911). See also Young v. Kidder, 33 N.M. 654, 275 Pac. 98
(1929), where the court discussed the foreign corporation statutes in light of the real
estate "qualifying statutes."
5. Ibid.
6. 382 P.2d 720 (N.M. 1963).
7. The note was executed by defendant Keeter and was signed by defendant
Marchiando as accomodation maker. The "defendant" referred to in this comment is
Keeter.
8. The term "general agent," as used by the court and as commonly used by insurance
agents, refers to an agent who acts as the equivalent of a wholesaler, or distributor, and
who has no contact with the buying public.
9. The term "local insurance agent," as used by the court and as commonly used by
insurance agents, refers to an agent who "retails" insurance--one who deals with the
buying public.
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miums, and remit the premiums less commissions.10 Defendent executed a promissory note to plaintiff in lieu of cash payment of premiums owed to the
companies. Defendant defaulted and plaintiff brought an action on the note.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had
been transacting business in New Mexico in contravention of section 51-10-4
and was therefore barred from using the New Mexico courts. On appeal to
the New Mexico Supreme Court, held, Reversed and Remanded with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff."
The supreme court limited its discussion to the issue of "whether the activities of . . . [plaintiff] in New Mexico amounted to 'transacting business' so as to bring it within the purview of . . . [section 51-10-4]."12 The

court based its decision that there was no "transaction of business" upon the
facts that plaintiff did not maintain an office in New Mexico, did not solicit
business for its insurance companies directly, and no independent contracts
were made with agents on plaintiff's behalf. Plaintiff's only activity in New
Mexico was the selection, supervision, and removal of local agents on behalf
of its insurance companies. 13 The court concluded, inter alia, that:
If the making and delivery of the promissory note in New Mexico
could be said to constitute transacting business here, it is but a single
act of business which this court has held would not bring a foreign
4
corporation within its qualifying statutes.'
However, in Mel/i v. Goodman,'5 a 1962 case, the supreme court construed

the phrase "transaction of business," contained in section 21-3-16, New Mexico States Annotated,' 6 to include the execution of a single promissory note
in New Mexico by a resident of New Mexico, who was a major shareholder in a New Mexico corporation, to a non-resident in satisfaction of a
10. Although only two agreements between the parties called for payments of
premiums to plaintiff, there was no evidence that defendant paid any money directly
to the insurance companies. Hence, the note included all moneys due and owing plaintiff.
11. J. H. Silversmith, Inc. v. Keeter, 382 P.2d 720, 723 (N.M. 1963).

12. Id. at 722.
13. The court held that "in effect ... [plaintiff's] office was the same as the 'office'
of the insurers." Ibid. Any debtor-creditor relationship arose, therefore, not between
plaintiff and defendant, but between the insurance companies and defendant.
14. Id. at 723.
15. 69 N.M. 488, 368 P.2d 582 (1962).

16.
Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or
through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby
submits himself or his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts
of this state as to any cause of action arising from:
(1) The transaction of any business within this state . . ..
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-16 (A) (1) (Supp. 1963).
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judgment outstanding against the corporation. 17 In an action to enjoin the
non-resident from foreclosing a mortgage given to secure the note, the trial
court entered an order quashing service made upon defendant because "defendant did not come within the purview of the statute, and, further, that
the statute was unconstitutional." 18 On appeal to the New Mexico Supreme
Court, held, Reversed and Remanded with directions to vacate the order
quashing the service and proceed with the trial. Defendant was subject to
jurisdiction under section 21-3-16 and could be sued in the New Mexico
courts.

19

The test adopted by the court in Melfi provided that the power of a New
Mexico court to enter a binding judgment against an individual who was not
served with process in New Mexico "depends upon two questions: first,
whether he has certain minimum contacts with the state 20 . . . and, second,
whether there has been a reasonable method of notification." ' 2 '
If the test for "transaction of business" used in Melfi had been applied
to the facts of Silversmith, then Silversmith, a foreign corporation, could not
have maintained its action in the New Mexico court; section 51-10-5 would
have barred action. Since New Mexico has ruled that foreign corporations
are subject to service of process, although this is not specifically enumerated
in the statutes, 22 the ruling in Melfi might properly have been used in Silver-

smith.
17. Plaintiff, to protect the corporation from execution of the judgment, agreed to
purchase the judgment, paying defendant $10,000 cash, the balance to be paid in semiannual installments of $6,500. A mortgage was assigned to defendant as security. The
agreement was entered into, and the initial payment was made, in Lincoln County, New
Mexico. Defendant thereafter threatened to foreclose the mortgage and execute on the
judgment even though plaintiff was not in default.
18. Melfi v. Goodman, 69 N.M. 488, 490, 368 P.2d 582, 583 (1962).
The supreme court disposed of the trial court's ruling of unconstitutionality by
summarily stating that the due process clause was not violated by the statute. Among the
cases cited as authority for this statement is Nelson v. Miller, 11 111. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d
673 (1957). In the Nelson case, action was brought by a resident of Illinois for negligence
against a resident of Wisconsin who appeared specially to quash personal service made
on him. The Supreme Court of Illinois interpreted their service of process statute, Ill.
Stat. Ann. ch. 110, § 17 (Supp. 1962) [from which New Mexico drafted N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 21-3-16 (Supp. 1963)), in light of the doctrine of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945), and found that the service did not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."
19. Melfi v. Goodman, 69 N.M. 488, 491, 368 P.2d 582, 584 (1962).
20. The phrase "minimum contacts" or "minimal contacts" as stated by the court in
Melfi v. Goodman, 69 N.M. 488, 491, 368 P.2d 582, 584 (1962), originated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and is now uniformly recognized
as the test for determining whether due process requirements are met when personal
service is made upon non-residents out of the state of the forum.
21. 69 N.M. at 491, 368 P.2d at 584 (1962). The court adopted the language of
Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961), which dealt with the construction of Ill. Stat. Ann. ch. 110, § 17 (Supp. 1962).
22. See Crawford v. Refiners Co-op. Ass'n., 71 N.M. 1, 375 P.2d 212 (1962),
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That the term "transaction of business" has been interpreted to mean different things in different situations is clear. The United States Supreme Court
has recognized that the definition of "doing business" varies in direct relation to the type of problem involved.2 3 But is a double definitional standard
necessary? Does it not seem reasonable at first glance to conclude that a foreign corporation which is subject to actions brought against it in a state court
should also be found to be "qualified to do business in the state" under foreign corporations statutes? The answers to these questions hinge upon the
requirements of due process 24 and of the commerce clause 25 of the Constitution, respectively. Foreign corporations may be served with process only
where the requirements of due process are met.26 At the same time, such
corporations must be able to move freely in interstate commerce. These considerations lead to the divergence in definitional standards as illustrated by
Melfi and Silversmith.
Virtually all states have statutes requiring foreign corporations to comply
with certain procedures before "doing business" in their state.27 In New
Mexico, the statutory language differs; section 51-10-4 states that "[e]very
foreign corporation, except banking, insurance and railroad corporations, before transacting any business in this state . . ." must comply with certain
28
procedures.
When defining minimum activity necessary to require the application of
section 51-10-4 and the similar statutes of other states, 29 courts have been limited by the facts of each case and by the protection afforded foreign corporations under the commerce clause of the Constitution. The rule generally accepted by the United States Supreme Court has been recognized to be:
When a corporation is engaged in interstate commerce in a state
other than that of its residence, and as a related part of such engagement there are performed acts which are merely incidental to the
where the court held that there was no question but that the legislative intent of N.M.
Stat. Ann. §§ 64-24-3 to -4 (1953) was to include corporations as well as natural persons within the meaning of the term "non-residents."
23. Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
24. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
25. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
26. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See note 31 intra.
27. See Fletcher, Private Corporations § 8606 (1955), for a collection of such statutes.
28. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-10-4 (1953). (Emphasis added.) See note 1 supra for the
text of the statute.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico, however, in Goode v. Colorado Inv. Loan
Co., 16 N.M. 461, 117 Pac. 856 (1911), found that the phrase "transacting business"
should be held to be equivalent to the words "doing business" which are found in most
state statutes.
29. See note 27 supra.
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carrying on of such commerce, such acts will not constitute doing
business in that state within the meaning of . . . [the qualifying]
statutes . .

.0

When dealing with the activity necessary for courts to acquire jurisdiction
over foreign corporations transacting business in a state, however, it must
be recognized that the tests for jurisdiction have undergone great change
during the last fifty years. 3 ' The trend today "is clearly discernible toward
expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents" 3 2 to the limits set by the due process clause of
the Constitution, without eliminating restrictions imposed by state courts. Due
process, according to rationale taken from International Shoe Co. v. Wash33
ington,
[r]equires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment

in personum, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance
of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and sub3 4
stantial justice.'
It is essential in every case involving service of process that there be some
action by which a foreign corporation "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the bene35
fits and protection of its laws."
Service of process statutes such as New Mexico's were drafted to incor30. In re Bell Lumber Co., 149 F.2d 980, 985 (7th Cir. 1945). The court held that
the test to be applied was:
[I]f acts performed are not merely incidental to interstate commerce, but are
substantial with acts thereto, then the business is carrying on business in that
state and is subject to reasonable requirements of state statutes.
Ibid.
The court in Bell also commented that corporations should not be insulated merely
because they engage in interstate commerce. See also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs,
Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961), where plaintiff's contention that its interstate business insulated it from the New Jersey qualifying statute, even though it engaged in intrastate
business, was not accepted by the Court.
31. Any attempt to outline the development of the law in the last one hundred years
is beyond the scope of this comment. There are innumerable articles and treatises devoted to this very subject which may be consulted if the reader is interested in pursuing the subject. See, e.g., Comment, 8 N.Y.L.F. 293 (1962).
32. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
33. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
34. Nelson v. Miller, 11 111. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673, 677 (1957).
35. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
The requisite activity for jurisdictional purposes as set forth in International Shoe
has been discussed recently by the United State Supreme Court in two cases and has
been modified slightly in each decision. The Court, in McGee v. International Life
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porate the rationale of International Shoe;36 their purpose is to extend personal jurisdiction to the limits allowed under the Constitution.3 7 In so doing,
the use of the words "transaction of any business" was not intended to reflect
the meaning which had previously been ascribed to "doing business." Rather,
the "minimum contact" theory of jurisdiction has been "accepted as a guiding
light" 38 for the requirement of "transaction of any business." It is not the
purpose of the service of process statute to impose regulation upon business;
rather, it provides redress for the citizens of the state in its courts "against
persons who, having substantial contact with the State, incur obligations to
the State's protection." 3 9
Although the activity within the state is only incidental to the transaction
of interstate commerce by the foreign corporation, and any attempt to enIns. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), a case where the only contact by the insurance company (a foreign corporation) with a resident was the mailing of an insurance certificate to him, held that service of process and subsequent personal jurisdiction over
the insurance company did not violate the due process clause. One year later, however,
in Hanson, the Court limited the effect of McGee.
In Hanson, the controversy dealt with a part of the corpus of a trust established in
Delaware by a settlor who later became a domiciliary of Florida. The settlor died
and the survivors were divided into two factions. The "legatees," as one group was
called, insisted that the property in question passed under the residuary clause of the
settlor's will which had been admitted to probate in Florida. The other group, the
"appointees" and "beneficiaries," insisted that the property passed by the settlor's exercise of power of appointment expressed in the deed of trust in Delaware. The trustee
and the trust estate remained at all times in Delaware. The Supreme Court found that
Florida did not acquire jurisdiction over the trust estate or the trust merely by being
the "center of gravity" of the controversy and the most convenient forum for adjudication.
A case decided just after publication of Hanson, Grobark v. Addo Machine Co.,
18 I11.App. 2d 10, 151 N.E.2d 425 (1958), specifically applied the language of Hanson
to the Illinois service of process statute. The court in Grobark interpreted the language of its statute very literally and, using Hanson, concluded that physical presence
was necessary to acquire jurisdiction over foreign corporations. "Transaction of any
business" was said to require the commission of some definite act within the forum
state.
36. Illinois courts have concluded that it was the intention of the drafters of the
Illinois service of process statute, Ill. Stat. Ann. ch. 110, § 17 (Supp. 1962), to implement the "minimum contact" theory of jurisdiction enumerated in the International
Shoe case. See, e.g., Haas v. Fancher Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
37. In Orton v. Woods Oil and Gas Co., 249 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1957), the Circuit
Court of Appeals held that performance of professional services by the plaintiffs for
the benefit of the defendant foreign corporation were not sufficient to bring the defendant within any semblance of the "minimum contact" test followed in Illinois. The
court commented that to hold otherwise would push the International Shoe doctrine to
the breaking point and allow personal jurisdiction to transcend the bounds of due
process.
38. Id. at 201.
39. Nelson v. Miller, 11 111. App. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679 (1957). The Illinois
court used Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935), as authority for
its conclusion.
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40
force the "qualifying statute" will be held to be unconstitutional and void,
the exercise of service of process may be constitutional as within the due
process clause. When a foreign corporation enjoys the protection of state
courts (because it is not "doing business"), it is not unreasonable, but rather
in furtherance of fair play and substantial justice, to require that corpora41
tion to make its defense within the state.
In Silversmith, the Supreme Court of New Mexico applied the law of cases
dating from 191142 as authority for the position that a single act of business
was not transacting business for purposes of section 51-10-4. The general discussion of the law with regard to foreign corporations has illustrated the position taken by courts that "transaction of business" or "doing business" for
purposes of qualifying statutes includes the transaction of a chain of activities
which evidences an intent on the part of the foreign corporation to establish
business in the jurisdiction with residents of the jurisdiction.
In Melfi, the rule of the case reflects the trend set by the most recent cases
43
grappling with expansion of jurisdiction in light of the due process clause.
The "minimum contact" established by the execution of a promissory note
within New Mexico, coupled with reasonable notification, allowed jurisdiction to be exercised over the nonresident defendant. No chain of activity
needed to be shown since any discussion of violation of the commerce clause
would have been wholly immaterial.
If, therefore, a foreign corporation appears as a plaintiff in an action in
New Mexico, its activity in New Mexico is viewed in light of the commerce
clause; it may move freely within the state and use the state's courts without

40. Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 156 Fed. 1 (8th Cir. 1907)
Furst v. Brewster, 282 U.S. 493 (1931).
In Abner Mfg. Co. v. McLaughlin, 41 N.M. 97, 64 P.2d 387 (1937), the supreme
court recognized that interstate business was not "transacting business" within the
meaning of the qualifying statute and could not be regulated by the state.
41. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. App. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957). In Nelson, the
court recognized that if, in any given case, it would be burdensome to litigate the
action in the state of the plaintiff, the doctrine of forum nonconveniens would be available. In addition, nonresident defendants generally have the privilege of removal to
federal court and transfer to a district which would be more convenient. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 71, 114 (1958) ; 28 U.S.C. §§ 119, 163 (1958).

In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), the Court, after uttering
the now renowned phrase that "a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents"
(id. at 222; see note 25 supra and accompanying text), decided that to deny plaintiff
the right to redress in California courts would force plaintiff to "follow the insurance
company to a distant state in order to hold it legally accountable." According to the
Court, this would allow the insurance company the insulation of distance, thereby
making it judgment proof. However, any inconvenience to the insurer would not
amount to denial of due process.
42. See note 4 supra.
43. See note 35 supra.
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complying with the statutory requirements regarding qualification until its
activity is deemed to be intrastate. To hold otherwise would repress interstate
commerce. If the same corporation is a defendant, sued in a New Mexico
court, it is protected only by the due process clause and the "minimum contact" test set forth by the United States Supreme Court.
RICHARD L. GERDING

